intrusion is always an unjustified intrusion-simply that the cases where it is justified are cases in which the values intrinsic to criminal punishment (particularly retributive desert) are being trumped by values from a totally different moral realm. One of my favorite novelists, J. M.
Coetzee, may agree with Duff here as David Lurie, the central character in his novel Disgrace, explains his unwillingness to provide the university disciplinary board (under which he must defend himself against sexual harassment charges) with the expressions of remorse and repentance that they seek:
[We] went through the repentance business yesterday. I told you what I thought. I won't do it. I appeared before an officially constituted tribunal, before a branch of the law. Before that secular tribunal I pleaded guilty, a secular plea. That plea should suffice. Repentance is neither here nor there. Repentance belongs to another world, to another universe of discourse....[What you are asking] reminds me too much of Mao's China. Recantation, selfcriticism, public apology. I'm old fashioned. I would prefer simply to be put against a wall and shot. 3 I respectfully disagree with both Duff and Lurie (and perhaps Coetzee also) in this matter. In the present essay I plan to exploit the parenthetical insertion that occurs in the quoted paragraph with which I opened the essay. In so doing I will expand on a suggestion I have made in previous publications: that a significant part (but, of course, not all) of the harm and wrong of many (perhaps all) criminal offenses is the insulting communicative message of contempt conveyed to and about the victim (and the larger community) by the commission of a criminal offense. Duff's in passing parenthetical insertion suggests that this sort of thing happens with such infrequency as to be hardly worth mentioning. I disagree. I will argue that repentance, if a genuine withdrawal of the contemptuous message, lessens the harm and wrong in significant ways and thereby has a direct and significant bearing on the retributive punishment that the offender deserves for the crime.
If I am correct about this, it might still be considered controversial whether a reduction of punishment based on repentance should be conceptualized as mercy or rather as a more finely tuned understanding of justice. In this essay, however, I am not concerned to address this issue in any detail. 4 My concern is simply to argue that giving weight to repentance in sentencing is to give weight to a value that is in principle intrinsic to criminal punishment and not the intrusion of a value from a totally different moral realm.
5
4 Since repentance, in my view, to some degree lessens the harm or wrong of the crime, I tend to think it is better to think that counting it as relevant to sentencing is a matter of justice rather than mercy.
5 I say "in principle" because of my belief that there are in the real world of sentencing many practical reasons why one should be skeptical of counting repentance at the time of sentencingone of them being the difficulty of distinguishing genuine repentance from fake repentance as a strategy on the part of the defendant to get a lighter sentence. Also, there is the worry that one who seeks a lower sentence reveals thereby that he is perhaps not really repentant. I have developed these skeptical arguments at some length-along with a suggestion that such skepticism may be less justified in clemency or pardon decisions- Suppose all of the above is true. One still might ask what it has to do with criminal punishment-with the penal suffering that the criminal deserves. I will now attempt to address that issue.
9 Murphy and Hampton 1988, pp. 25-26 . I have in the quoted passage replaced the original phrase "attempts to degrade" with the phrase "reveals contempt" since the word "attempt" suggests a level of intention that is misleading. I do not mean to suggest that the wrongdoer must have the intention of delivering a message-or even to be consciously aware that this is what he is doing. The person who rapes probably just intends to have coerced sex, just as the person who buys a slave probably just intends to have some cheap forced labor. But surely the act of each expresses, at least symbolically or tacitly, a belief or attitude about their victims that conveys a willingness to use them, in Kant's language, as mere means or things to be exploited for the wrongdoers' own selfish purposes-all without any regard for the victims' rights as persons. A society that does not explicitly condemn such acts-perhaps through such powerful symbolism as criminal punishment-can be said to endorse the same message conveyed by the wrongdoers themselves.
To punish on retributive grounds is to punish as the criminal deserves to be punished.
11
Not all those who advocate retribution as a theory of punishment, however, agree on how the concept of desert is to be analyzed. (The first thing one will want to say, of course, is that desert must be analyzed as culpable wrongdoing. But how is that concept to be analyzed?) I will now run through the six (to me) most plausible accounts of retributive desert and try to show that a communicative theory of criminal wrongdoing and harm fits well into each of them. I emphasize retribution in the present essay because of Duff's reliance on penal desert as an important part of his communicative theory of punishment. I also have some serious worries about communicative theory itself. The more that a particular society is inegalitarian in its distribution of benefits and burdens, and the more that the underlying presupposition that all citizens are in fact regarded as of equal worth and value is not satisfied, then to that degree-in my view-is the communicative theory, however laudable as an aspirational ideal, largely inapplicable to that society. So my paper is in effect of an "if, then" form: If one subscribes to a communicative theory, and if one believes that penal desert is a central part of that theory, then one should count repentance as in principle intrinsically relevant to sentencing.
12 Kant 1996, p. 474. One might argue that Kant's phrase "inner wickedness" refers not to character but simply to those mental states (e.g., intention) that constitute the mens rea conditions for criminal offenses. Although I will not take time to argue for this here, I believe that the context surrounding Kant's remark supports my character interpretation. I also believe that mens rea considerations are not always easy to separate from considerations of character.
unrepentant wrongdoers, it is fairly easy to see how repentance would count as relevant on this version of retributivism. Surely the willful violation of the norms of the criminal law and the important individual and community rights those norms seek to protect is at least some evidence of bad character; and repentance of those acts of violation some evidence of a better character.
13 2. Grievance. With respect to grievance retributivism, it might initially seem that repentance could have no significant bearing on this. Why, one might well ask, would the grievance I have against a wrongdoer be less because at some later time the wrongdoer repents and even expresses sincere remorse through an act of apology? The communicative theory of harm and wrong that I have earlier suggested has, in my view, a plausible way of answering this question: To the degree that the wrongful harm is a function of the insulting and degrading message symbolically conveyed by the criminal act, then repentance-by a withdrawal of that message-lessens the wrongful harm and thus (at least in most cases) makes the criminal deserve, not acquittal surely, but less punishment than the unrepentant criminal.
14 Consider the mens rea conditions for what in American criminal law is generally called "depraved heart murder"-a killing that results from a level of recklessness so extreme as to reveal "a hardened, abandoned, and malignant heart indifferent to the value of human life." There is no canonical usage of much of the terminology that is involved in discussions of retribution. Some writers, for example, contrast character retributivism with choice retributivism. I have not elected to give choice retributivism a separate treatment in the present essay because I think that its essence-we should punish for bad choices not bad character-is captured in several of the accounts I give below.
Free Riding. Herbert Morris is well known for defending a version of retributivism in
which the criminal is said to deserve punishment as a sacrifice that, in fairness, he owes those who have been law abiding. 15 The law abiding have made the sacrifice of self-restraintvoluntarily obeying laws they would often prefer not to and have thereby made possible the benefits that a cooperative rule of law provides for all. The criminal enjoys these benefits but, unlike the rest of us, has not made the sacrifice of obedience. Thus, by such free riding, he has gained an unfair advantage over the law abiding and owes, as a kind of debt, a comparable sacrifice-a sacrifice that we impose on him in the act of punishment.
Of course one important thing wrong with free riding is its unfairness. I do not think, however, that the deep resentment that most of us feel toward the free rider is solely a function of the objective unfairness of what he does. 16 It is also, I believe, a function of the arrogant repudiating the message, the most effective way to do this is probably with some amount of actual punishment. Finally, letting the repentant offender off entirely would seem to me to give him too much of a role in what happens to him-as though this is all to be a function of his autonomous choices. It was perhaps excessive claims of autonomy that prompted his criminality in the first place. Herbert Fingarette's idea of law as "humbling the will," which I will discuss later in this essay, is relevant here. I use the phrase "at least in most cases" to leave open the possibility that some crimes and some criminals may be so horrendous that it would be improper to give them, even if repentant, any punishment less than the maximum that the law allowseven death if that is the maximum allowed. Are there such crimes and criminals? I have made a start in thinking about this in Murphy 2009. message of superiority that his free riding at least symbolically conveys: "I can claim for myself a liberty in action that-since I value the benefits made possible by the voluntary sacrifices of the obedient-I would not be willing to extend to others." I, and I think others, might well want to respond to this message in anger with the question "Just who in the hell do you think you are anyway?"-a question that we would probably not raise if the wrongdoer manifested sincere repentance.
Reflective Equilibrium.
In a justly celebrated essay, Michael Moore argues that retributivism, once freed from assorted confusions and bad arguments against it, captures better than any other theory of punishment the pretheoretical convictions that most of us have about just punishment and its relation to the concept of desert-and thereby puts us into that state of epistemic contentment that John Rawls called "reflective equilibrium." 17 I believe that many (perhaps most) of us-perhaps particularly those involved in the criminal law-have the conviction that repentance counts as relevant to penal desert and thus a total refusal to count it would disturb our reflective equilibrium. Consider, as a few examples of this, these comments from various actors in the institution of criminal law-one from a state governor denying clemency, one from a prosecuting attorney, one from a sentencing judge, one from a distinguished law professor (Michael Moore), and one from a United States Supreme Court Justice:
into the exit lane in front of those who had been legally waiting their turn. He said he became absolutely furious at the arrogance and presumption of the driver of this sports car. His theory came to him as he asked himself the question "Why does this make me so resentful?" S. 127, 143-144 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) . Realizing that sentencing agents will naturally think that a criminal lacking in remorse is particularly deserving of the death penalty, Justice Kennedy wants to make sure that an offender's failure to express remorse is truly a function of his actual character and not medication. I quote this opinion mainly as one more example of how many will find reflective equilibrium only in an account of punitive desert that makes room for repentance and remorse. It is also, of course, a good
The Humbling of the Will. In his Presidential Address to the American Philosophical
Association (Pacific Division) Herbert Fingarette argued that retribution should not be seen as a moral thesis but rather as a conceptual requirement-something intrinsic to the concept of law itself. 23 Law sets norms that demand obedience-demand that the individual will of the person be subordinated to the relevant norms. The person who disobeys the norms set by law is presuming to exercise his own will in a way that the norms forbid to him. Because of this, the will of the offender must-to use Fingarette's phrase-be humbled.
To the degree that repentance shows a will that has already been to some degree humbled, then to that degree-in my view-does remorseful repentance (the agenbite of inwit) render legitimate a sentence less severe than one deserved by one whose arrogant presumption remains intact.
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6. Victim Vindication. In our 1988 joint authored book, Jean Hampton-drawing I think on the communicative account I had in an earlier chapter given of criminal wrongdoing-argues that the retributive element in criminal punishment should be understood as victim vindicationthe righting of a wrongful message about the victim that, absent the punishment, would be allowed to stand unchallenged. She thought, indeed, that this was a way to give some sense to Hegel's puzzling claim that punishment annuls the crime:
example of assessments of character playing a role in sentencing. It is of course absurd to think that punishment annuls the crime in the sense of making it the case that the crime never happened or now goes away. What does go away, however-and is thus annulled-is the message of disrespect for the victim and, I would say, disrespect as well for the legal order of the relevant moral community. Punishment can thus be seen as a social ritual in which, through the symbolism of hard treatment, the message of contempt for the victim-a message that the victim is of less than equal value with the wrongdoer-is emphatically repudiated and another message-that of the full value of the victim as an equal citizen-is emphatically asserted.
And what bearing might repentant remorse (and perhaps public apology as well) have on this vision of wrongdoing, harm, and punishment? Just this: The wrongdoer, through repentant remorse and apology, is on his own withdrawing the contemptuous message and trying to do I await with some trepidation Duff's response to the argument I have presented. I suspect that he will have powerful counter arguments-arguments that may force me to change my own views or leave us in the position where, neither of us being fully persuaded by the other, we must simply agree to disagree. Knowing Duff as a man of kind restraint and humility, I can at least take comfort in the fact that I will probably not have to suffer the response that my friend the late Peter Winch told me he once encountered from Jonathan Bennett. Presenting a paper at the
